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
PERSPECTIVES

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BREZHNEV IN YUGOSLAVIA

ADDENDUM TO "THE UBIQUITOUS KGB"
(in Perspectives for November 1971)

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BREZHNEV IN YUGOSLAVIA

Among the many diplomatic tours currently being made by top Soviet leaders, Brezhnev's trip to Tito's Yugoslavia 22-25 September continues to merit special attention. The meeting was arranged at a time when relations between the two countries were at a new low. Contributing to this low were continuous Soviet polemical attacks on the Yugoslav system of socialism, and persistent Soviet efforts to subvert Yugoslavia ideologically. (Peking's recent overtures to Yugoslavia have also contributed to the Soviet-Yugoslav tensions.) Nevertheless, the post-meeting joint Soviet-Yugoslav communique and statement indicate that Brezhnev and Tito did manage to reach some accommodation which temporarily papered over fundamental, long-standing differences. As to the longevity of their accommodation, there is little doubt that as far as Brezhnev is concerned, the issues agreed to were a matter of verbal gymnastics and his concessions to Yugoslav requirements were so qualified by double meanings and ambiguities as to be more apparent than real.

The major differences underlying Soviet-Yugoslav relations revolve around the Yugoslav concept of "separate roads to socialism" and the opposing Soviet concept of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" of limited sovereignty. The September meeting, on paper anyway, resulted in an explicit reaffirmation of the Belgrade Declaration of 1955 (which accepted the concept of separate roads to socialism), and in the course of his visit, Brezhnev seemed to disavow his "Brezhnev Doctrine." As these conflicting concepts lie at the heart of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, it would be well briefly to review their origins and significance.

Ever since 1948 when Tito broke out of the system of satellitehood devised by Stalin and perpetuated by his successors to control Eastern Europe, Tito's independent brand of Communism has been a thorn in the Soviets' side in that Yugoslavia's independence has served as an attractive example for the remaining Satellites to imitate. Consequently, the USSR has tried all manner of devices to neutralize Yugoslavia's influence. Stalin tried threats and blatant subversion; Khrushchev tried cajolery. In 1955 he travelled to Belgrade where his trip resulted in the Belgrade Declaration, in which the Soviet Union accepted the Yugoslav principle that a socialist country may pursue its "own road to socialism" independent of the Soviet model. It also assured Soviet respect for principles of sovereignty, independence, integrity, and equality among states and non-interference in another's internal affairs "for any reason whatever."

These same principles were reaffirmed the following year during a Moscow meeting between Tito and the Soviet leaders. The resultant communique became known as the 1956 Moscow Declaration. Three months later, the Soviets invaded Hungary. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia just three years after Brezhnev and Tito had met in 1968, to reaffirm again the principles of the 1955 Belgrade Declaration, did little to dispel Yugoslav suspicions about the USSR's true intentions.

In addition to violating the very heart of the Belgrade and subsequent declarations, the Soviets devised a doctrinal justification for their intervention in Czechoslovakia. This doctrine holds that there are certain fundamental laws of socialism (for which the Soviet Union is the self-proclaimed prototype and model) from which no socialist country may deviate lest socialism itself be jeopardized. If a country, exercising its sovereignty, decides to follow its own road to socialism and in so doing deviates from the Soviet model (or rather, is deemed by the Soviets to have deviated), then the Soviets can decide that sovereignty has exceeded its proper limits and can intervene in the "common interests of world socialism." In brief, Soviet hegemony is held to be more important than individual sovereignty. This is the doctrine that became known, quite appropriately, as the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty. In Brezhnev's own words at the 5th Polish Party Congress on 12 November 1968:

"It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union has done much for the real strengthening of the sovereignty and independence of the socialist countries. However, it is known, comrades, that there also are common laws governing socialist construction, a deviation from which might lead to a deviation from socialism as such. And when the internal and external forces hostile to socialism seek to revert the development of any socialist country toward the restoration of the capitalist order, when a threat to the cause of socialism in that country, a threat to the security of the socialist community as a whole, emerges, this is no longer only a problem of the people of that country, but also a common problem, a concern for all socialist states.

"It goes without saying that such an action as military aid to a fraternal country to cut short the threat to the socialist order is an extraordinary, emergency step; it can be sparked only by direct actions creating a threat to the common interests of the camp of socialism."

Now, the Brezhnev-Tito joint statement explicitly reaffirmed the validity of the 1955, 1956, and 1965 declarations, and therefore the validity of independent forms of Communism. This concession was very much desired by Yugoslavia, and Brezhnev seemed to have no hesitation in obliging the Yugoslavs in their wish. Back in 1955, when the concept of separate roads to socialism ("Titoism") was

first endorsed by the Soviets, it was a concession of substantive import in that it seemed to give license to other East European regimes to strike out independently, as indeed some did: Gomulka's Poland for a time in 1956, under threat of Soviet intervention; the same year Soviet tanks crushed Hungary's experiment in a separate road to socialism. Dubcek tried his own road in Czechoslovakia in 1968, only to have his effort, too, crushed by Soviet tanks. Today, Brezhnev can feel safe in paying lip service to "Titoism;" the invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia speak much more loudly than his own words ostensibly endorsing sovereignty. Today, it is hard to imagine any Satellite embarking autonomously on its own road to socialism, tempting though it undoubtedly is, for example, in Hungary and Poland. Brezhnev's acceptance of "Titoism" for Yugoslavia is simply recognizing a reality that for the time being he cannot change, short of military intervention. Thus, Brezhnev's "concession" now is devoid of practical significance.

His concession on the doctrine of limited sovereignty was no more than a matter of semantics. On Brezhnev's arrival at the airport near Belgrade, he referred to the doctrine, calling it a fable and a slander:

"We and you well know that various forces which are not averse to hampering such a development in our relations and striving to inflate any differences between us exist in the world. It was they who have circulated the fable about the so-called 'doctrine of limited sovereignty' and spreading rumors about Soviet armies allegedly being prepared to move into the Balkans and many other tall tales. They claim that Yugoslavia is some sort of 'grey zone,' that it 'is going over to the West' and so on and so forth. I do not think it is worth wasting time in refuting all these slanderous concoctions. However, they remind us that the cause of Soviet-Yugoslav friendship needs to be defended. It is necessary to defend it, and to defend it time and again."

What Brezhnev was doing was simply disavowing the words used in the free world to describe an active doctrine which the Soviets applied to Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. If Brezhnev had really meant to disavow the doctrine itself, he would have made some reference to Czechoslovakia when he spoke of the "doctrine of limited sovereignty" or would have permitted some reference to Czechoslovakia in the joint statement. Whatever the words, the Soviets' assumption of a right to intervene militarily or otherwise when they deem their hegemony to be threatened remains intact.

In his apparent desire to conciliate Tito, Brezhnev gave way on other, lesser contested points. For example, he acknowledged that non-alignment (a favorite pursuit of Tito with India and

Egypt) can contribute to the anti-imperialist struggle. This concession has little meaning in view of the recent Soviet treaties with India and Egypt, by virtue of which neither country can really be considered non-aligned. Brezhnev made other verbal concessions on the value to Yugoslavia of their much vaunted worker-management system in factories and enterprises and on matters of reciprocity in information (i.e. propaganda) activities in the two countries.

Brezhnev had a number of reasons for making these various verbal concessions. In the first place, his behavior was in consonance with the pursuit of current Soviet detente diplomacy. In particular, he wished to enlist Tito's support for a European security conference. Also, he may have seen his visit as a step toward offsetting recent Chinese gains in the area. For the time being then he may hope for a cessation of the polemics that have embittered relations and put the Soviet Union in a bad light. But it is hard to imagine that there can be more than a temporary truce between the two countries. The Soviet Union finds it dangerous to tolerate indefinitely the existence of a competing, more attractive and viable form of socialism which neighboring East European countries might hope some time to emulate. As long as Tito rules Yugoslavia, the Soviets may have to renounce any hopes of neutralizing the Yugoslav example, but this is not to say that the Soviets have renounced the hope of eventually reintegrating Yugoslavia into their orbit.

A curious aftermath of the Brezhnev visit reveals Soviet duplicity and the value they attach to Tito's requirements for "normalized" relations. Pravda's 2 October editorial treatment of the visit completely ignored all aspects of the joint statement which the Yugoslavs considered important -- and tried to convey the impression that Yugoslavia had abandoned non-alignment and made common cause with the Soviet Bloc. Only after Yugoslav publicists complained about this crude distortion did a Soviet commentator writing in Pravda 14 October seek to give a more balanced appraisal of the statement. But the first Pravda evaluation undoubtedly represents what the Soviets believe Yugoslav attitudes should be, and will be, if not now, then in the future. On the other hand, symbolic of Yugoslav defiance of any Soviet desire to extend its hegemony over Yugoslavia are the army "Freedom '71" maneuvers in the northwest part of Yugoslavia near the Hungarian (i.e. Soviet Bloc) border concurrently with Soviet-Hungarian military maneuvers in Hungary.

(Attached are pertinent citations from the 1955 Belgrade Declaration, the full text of the 1956 Moscow Declaration and of current Joint Statement, the 2 October Pravda editorial, a critical Yugoslav newspaper comment on the editorial, and a selection of Western newspaper accounts of the meeting.)

BREZHNEV-TITO 1971 VISIT DOCUMENTATION AND COMMENTARY
(Underlining emphasis added)

1. Excerpts from Belgrade Declaration 2 June 1955

"...During the talks which were conducted in a spirit of friendship and mutual understanding, opinions were exchanged on international problems concerning the interests of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and questions of political, economic, and cultural relations between the two countries were thoroughly discussed...

"In discussing the questions which were the subject of the talks, and with the aim of strengthening trust and cooperation among nations, the two governments decided to proceed from the following principles:

"Indivisibility of peace on which alone collective security can rest;

"Respect of sovereignty, independence, integrity, and equality among states in mutual relations and relations with other countries;

"Recognition and development of peaceful coexistence among nations regardless of ideological differences and differences in social systems, which implies cooperation of all states in the field of international relations in general and of economic and cultural relations in particular;

"Adherence to the principle of mutual respect and noninterference in internal affairs for any reason whatever, be it for economic, political, or ideological nature, since questions of internal order, of different social systems, and different forms of development of Socialism are the exclusive business of the peoples of the respective countries..."

"Removing any forms of propaganda and misinformation and other measures which spread distrust, and in any way impede the creation of an atmosphere favorable for constructive international cooperation and peaceful coexistence of nations...

"For the government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz-Tito.

"For the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union."

2. Text of the Moscow Declaration 20 June 1956

DECLARATION ON RELATIONS BETWEEN THE YUGOSLAV
LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
THE SOVIET UNION, JUNE 20, 1956⁴

DURING THE OFFICIAL visit of the Government Delegation of
the FPRY [Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia] to the
Soviet Union, from June 1 to June 23, 1956, Josip Broz-Tito,

⁴ See *New Times*, No. 26, June, 1956, Special Supplement.

General Secretary of the YLC, Edvard Kardelj, Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee, YLC, and Members of the CC, YLC, Jakov Blazevic, Veljko Micunovic, Koca Popovic, and Mijalko Todorovic, as representatives of the Yugoslav League of Communists and of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia; and N. S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the CC, CPSU, Members of the Presidium of the CC, CPSU, N. A. Bulganin, K. Y. Voroshilov, A. I. Mikoyan, and V. M. Molotov, and alternate member of the Presidium of the CC, CPSU, D. T. Shepilov, as representatives of the CPSU, exchanged opinions, in a spirit of comradely sincerity and candor, on relations and cooperation between the YLC and CPSU.

In the course of the conversations they agreed upon the following:

1. The Belgrade Declaration of June 2, 1955, placed relations between the two socialist countries on a healthy footing, and the principles formulated in it are finding ever broader application in their mutual cooperation.

2. Cooperation between the two countries and the general development of their relations since the signing of the Belgrade Declaration, and also the contacts established between their political and other public organizations, have created favorable political conditions for cooperation also between the CPSU and the YLC.

Proceeding from the foregoing, bearing in mind the concrete conditions of development of the modern socialist movements, and guided by the internationalist principles of Marxism-Leninism, the delegations of the YLC and CPSU have agreed on the need and value of continuously developing existing contacts between the two parties for cooperation in further strengthening our socialist countries and promoting their prosperity, for cooperation in the international labor movement on a wide range of questions concerning the present development of socialism, and also for the development of peaceful coexistence and cooperation between the nations of the world, regardless of difference in social and political systems, in the interests of the peace, freedom, and independence of the peoples.

The representatives of the two parties proceed from the premise that continued development of contacts and cooperation between the CPSU and YLC, as the leading parties in countries where the working class is in power, and as parties which share the common aim of building a complete socialist society in their countries and ensuring human progress and durable peace, will undoubtedly facilitate further cooperation between the USSR and FPRY and the promotion of enduring friendship between their peoples.

3. Believing that the path of socialist development differs in various countries and conditions, that the multiplicity of forms of socialist development tends to strengthen socialism, and proceeding from the fact that any tendency of imposing one's opinion on the ways and forms of socialist development

is alien to both—the two parties have agreed that their cooperation shall be based on complete voluntariness and equality, friendly criticism, and comradely exchange of opinions on controversial questions.

4. With the above as a basis, cooperation between the YLC and CPSU will develop primarily through comprehensive mutual acquaintance with the forms and methods of socialist construction in both countries, free and comradely exchange of experience and opinions on questions of common interest for the development of socialist practice and for the advancement of socialist thought, and also on questions concerning peace, rapprochement, and intercourse between nations, and human progress generally.

5. The present material and spiritual reconstruction of the world, which finds expression in the tremendous growth of the forces of socialism, the upsurge of the national-liberation movement, the increased part played by the working class in the solution of concrete questions of international development, poses a number of momentous tasks before the international labor movement. From this follows the need for scientific analysis of developments and of the basic material and social factors and trends in the present-day world. For these reasons the two parties have agreed that guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism, they will do everything to encourage—both in their relations and in the international labor movement generally—mutual cooperation and exchange of opinions in the field of socialist scientific thought.

6. With regard to concrete forms of cooperation between the YLC and the CPSU, the delegations have agreed that it will be carried out through personal contacts, written and oral communications and exchange of opinions, through exchange of delegations, information matter, and literature, as well as through personal meetings of party leaders, when necessary, to discuss pressing problems of common interest, and generally through all forms of constructive comradely discussion.

7. The representatives of the CPSU and YLC consider such cooperation to be a component part of their contacts with other Communist and Workers Parties, and also with the socialist and other progressive movements of the world.

8. The CPSU and YLC believe that the promotion of durable peace, security, and social progress requires broad cooperation between all progressive and peace-loving forces, which is making itself increasingly felt in diverse forms and on a world scale. This cooperation is an essential need of modern social development. Such contacts must be equal, frank, democratic, and accessible to world public opinion. They should serve as a means of reciprocal information and consultation on diverse problems of general interest, and should foster closer understanding, based on tolerant explanation of the positions and views of the parties. This presupposes freedom of action for each and every participant in this cooperation, in conformity with the conditions of their development and their general progressive aims.

The representatives of the YLC and the CPSU are confident that cooperation between the workers' movements of the FPRY and the Soviet Union, based on these principles and forms, will serve the interest of their peoples and of socialist construction in their countries. They are confident that by such cooperation they will contribute to a general rapprochement between socialist and other progressive movements of the world, which will likewise serve the interests of world peace and human progress.

For the Central Committee
of the YLC
JOSIP BROZ-TITO,
General Secretary

For the Central Committee
of the CPSU
N. KHRUSHCHEV,
First Secretary

Moscow, June 20, 1956

3. Text of the Joint Statement, Belgrade, 25 September 1971

Josip Broz Tito, president of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [SFRY] and the LCY, and Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, during an exhaustive exchange of views in Belgrade from 22 to 25 September 1971 noted that there exists a good basis for the further development of Yugoslav-Soviet relations, the extension of cooperation between the LCY and CPSU, and between the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the USSR in the interests of their efforts in the construction of socialism and communism, safeguarding peace and international security, as well as consolidating the struggle for freedom and independence of all nations, and social progress and socialism.

The cooperation between the SFRY and the USSR is based on the closeness of historic destinies, identity of the foundations of social order, proximity of approach to many international problems, loyalty to principles of socialist internationalism, the general struggle for peace, independence and equal international cooperation and struggle against imperialism.

This creates favorable conditions for fruitful cooperation between our peoples, parties and states and for a constructive solution of all questions arising in our mutual relations, regardless of their complexity. The LCY and CPSU proceed from the fact that only the teaching of Marx, Engels and Lenin, which is applied creatively and developed in consonance with the distinctive characteristics of each country, can be the indispensable foundation, both now and in the future, for the policy of communist and workers parties, which stand at the head of their peoples and the working class in the struggle for the construction of a socialist society. The methods of socialist construction which reflect the experience and the specific aspects in the development of individual countries are a matter for the peoples and the working classes in individual countries and need not contradict each other.

The development of all-round Yugoslav-Soviet relations is based on the principles set forth in the 1955 Belgrade declaration, the 1956 Moscow statement and declaration and the 1965 joint Yugoslav-Soviet statement.

The two sides consider it is necessary for them to continue to develop, on these foundations, friendly cooperation between the LCY and CPSU as parties which conduct socialist and communist construction in their countries and to consolidate the trust which should characterize mutual relations between the two parties and two sovereign countries.

Both sides will encourage more frequent meetings, exchanges of views and consultations at various levels between the LCY and CPSU and the SFRY and USSR on questions of bilateral relations and foreign policy. The two sides are convinced that this contributes to better mutual understanding and cooperation.

Considering the practice of interparty links which has proved to be mutually beneficial, the LCY and CPSU will broaden the exchange of party delegations and encourage cooperation between party and scientific institutions, as well as the development of contacts and links between local party organizations.

The LCY and CPSU will continue to contribute to the broad development of cooperation between the SFRY and USSR in the political and economic fields, as well as in science, technology and culture.

The two sides are convinced that there are great possibilities for expanding and deepening economic and scientific-technical cooperation between the SFRY and USSR, both on a bilateral and multilateral basis, including cooperation based on the agreement between the SFRY and CEMA.

The basic trends of the further development of Yugoslav-Soviet economic relations lie in the broadening of commodity trade, mutually beneficial cooperation and specialized production, and design and research work, especially in those branches which determine modern scientific-technical progress. In this sense the two sides welcome the conclusion of the 1971-75 agreement between the SFRY and USSR. Both parties consider it indispensable to work toward developing economic cooperation between the SFRY and USSR at a rapid rate. The intragovernment committee for economic and scientific-technical cooperation and the appropriate economic organs and organizations of the two countries will study all possibilities and take the necessary steps with a view to an even more efficient and rapid development of economic relations.

The LCY and CPSU stress the importance of the further development of relations, on a reciprocal basis, in press, radio and television, culture and the arts. They believe that the mass communications media, which have great possibilities, should act in the interest of consolidating reciprocal respect and friendship between the peoples of the SFRY and USSR, and an objective and well-intentioned illustration of efforts undertaken by both countries in socialist and communist construction should contribute to that.

The two sides attach great importance to the extension of direct contacts between the working people of the SFRY and USSR and the development of cooperation between trade union, youth, women, tourists, sport and other mass organizations with a view to better reciprocal understanding and acquaintance with the life of the peoples of both countries.

The LCY and CPSU proceed from the fact that the growth of the forces of peace, progress and socialism represents the chief characteristic of the present-day international situation, which remains complex and contradictory. Parallel with this, the attempts of reaction to slow the process of social transformation of the world and arrest the struggle of peoples for their freedom and independence do not abate.

The forces of imperialism aspire to a domination over peoples, their economic and political subordination, preservation and consolidation of colonialism and neocolonialism and meddling in the internal affairs of other peoples. They are attempting to preserve the capitalist system of exploitation of peoples and put a brake on social progress. Such a policy represents a constant source of international tension, local wars, and instability of world peace.

In these conditions the interests of all countries and movements aiming at constructing socialism and communism and the interests of the struggle against aggressive aspirations of imperialist circles and for safeguarding peace and international security, for freedom, independence and social progress of peoples, are identical in many respects.

The LCY and CPSU attach great importance to the overall development of mutual links between communist and workers parties and the national liberation movement and all progressive forces in the name of peace, freedom and independent development of peoples.

The Soviet side supports the anti-imperialist orientation of the policy of nonaligned countries and, in this connection, makes a positive assessment of its role in consolidating peace and international cooperation, in the struggle of the peoples against colonialism and neocolonialism and for independent and social progress.

The SFRY and USSR and the LCY and CPSU strive for developing broad cooperation based on equality between countries and peoples to strengthen peace and international security. By their policies they will continue to make an active contribution, in international relations, to the affirmation of the principles of peaceful coexistence of states regardless of their social systems.

The military cooperation during World War II lives in the memory of the peoples of the SFRY and USSR, and its traditions strengthen the resolve of the SFRY and USSR to struggle for peace, international cooperation and security throughout the world.

The SFRY and USSR, as two European states which suffered enormous losses in the struggle against the fascist invaders, are vitally interested in the consolidation of stable peace in Europe so that a sound system of European security can be established. They note with satisfaction that the processes of relaxing tension are developing in Europe, that there is a noticeable turn toward a realistic assessment of the social and political changes which have taken place in the postwar period, as well as toward the recognition of existing frontiers. In positively assessing the conclusion of treaties between the USSR and the People's Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany, the two sides declare themselves in favor of their coming into force as soon as possible. The quadripartite agreement on questions related to West Berlin represents a major step toward normalizing the situation in Europe. The further improvement of this situation in Europe should be served by the convening, in the near future, of an all-European conference on questions of security and cooperation.

The SFRY and USSR are supporters of consolidating lasting peace and security in the Balkan Peninsula, an important element of which could be the proclamation of the Balkans as a nuclear-free zone.

The LCY and CPSU resolutely condemn the aggression of the United States and its allies against the peoples of Indochina. They support the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people and the peoples of Laos and Cambodia and strenuously insist on an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the armed forces of the United States and its allies from Indochina.

The SFRY and USSR confirm their resolute support for the struggle of the Arab peoples to wipe out the consequences of Israeli aggression and free the territory occupied by Israel. The two sides advocate complete implementation of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 and the establishment of the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine. They agree that the attainment of a political solution in the Middle East would contribute to making conditions ripe for the implementation of measures toward relaxing military tension in that entire area, especially for the transformation of the Mediterranean into a sea of peace and friendly cooperation.

The SFRY and USSR consider an increased role of the United Nations as an instrument of peace and international security and the need of unconditional respect for the UN Charter and the insuring of United Nations universality to be indispensable. They are in favor of establishing the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, of the simultaneous acceptance of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany as UN members and the cessation of the discriminatory policy against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the United Nations.

The conclusion of a number of international agreements to limit the armament race represents a significant achievement in recent years. The SFRY and USSR believe it to be indispensable to persistently follow the road of implementing practical measures in the field of disarmament, particularly to ban mass destruction weapons-- nuclear, bacteriological and chemical.

In considering disarmament as a material basis of the policy of relaxation of tension and improvement of international relations, the SFRY and USSR believe that the question of reducing armed forces and armaments in Europe has become ripe. The SFRY and USSR consider the five nuclear powers conference to be useful. They are in favor of convening a world disarmament conference.

The SFRY and USSR demand the liquidation of all remnants of colonialism. They express resolute support for the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, who defend their freedom and independence in the struggle against forces of imperialism and neocolonialism.

The LCY and CPSU express their profound conviction that the development of comprehensive cooperation between the two parties and countries is in keeping with the vital interests of the peoples of the SFRY and USSR. Friendship between the peoples of the SFRY and USSR, which was tempered in the joint heroic struggle against fascist invaders, represents their invaluable achievement. The LCY and CPSU will do everything they can so that the friendship between the peoples of the two countries may constantly strengthen and represent an active factor in the struggle of the SFRY and USSR for peace and socialism.

Belgrade, 25.9.1971

Josip Broz Tito, president of the SFRY and LCY.

Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

4. "Brotherhood and Unity," Pravda, 2 October 1971

The socialist world is gathering new forces and developing with optimism and confidence in its historical prospects. The socialist countries are united by community of the sociopolitical system, coincidence of fundamental interests and aims, and loyalty to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. By coordinating their actions and agreeing on positions on the main foreign policy questions the fraternal countries are exerting an increasingly active and decisive influence on the international situation and on the course of the modern revolutionary forces' common struggle against imperialism and for peace, democracy and socialism. Cooperation allows them, by enriching each other's experience, jointly to solve the fundamental problems of socialist and communist building, to find the most rational forms of economic ties and collectively to determine a common line in foreign policy activity.

The recently concluded friendly visits which Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, made to Yugoslavia, Hungary and Bulgaria were a weighty contribution to the cause of further strengthening the unity of the socialist countries.

The talks in Belgrade, Budapest and Sofia were an important step on the path of the increasingly close coordination of the fraternal parties' and countries' foreign policy activity and of their extensive and multifaceted cooperation. Speaking to Yugoslav workers in Zemun, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev said: "The Soviet Union has believed and believes that under modern conditions, when the antagonism between the forces of reaction and progress and the forces of capitalism and socialism is not ceasing in the world arena, the socialist states' active and coordinated policy must be counterposed to the actions of imperialism and reaction."

The line of further strengthening the unity of the socialist community countries found its specific embodiment in the results of L.I. Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia. New prospects for developing mutually advantageous and truly fraternal cooperation were revealed as a result of the fruitful talks. As is noted in the joint statement adopted at the talks, cooperation between the USSR and Yugoslavia is based on community of the bases of the social system and adherence to the principles of socialist internationalism. The results of the visit showed that the peoples of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are united by common class interests and by unity of ultimate aims. In the worldwide historic struggle against imperialist aggression and for the consolidation of peace and the triumph of freedom and progress the peoples of our countries stand on the same side of the barricade as comrades and brothers in arms. The viewpoints of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union proceed from common vital interests in creating a reliable system of European security, holding a pan-European conference and strengthening stable peace and security in the Balkans.

The USSR and Yugoslavia support the heroic struggle of the peoples of Indochina, insisting firmly on the immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops and those of their allies from this region, they confirm their decisive support for the Arab peoples' struggle to liquidate the consequences of Israeli aggression, and they support the implementation of practical measures in the field of disarmament and demand the liquidation of all vestiges of colonialism.

An important and comradely exchange of opinions took place in Budapest and in Sofia. The meetings and talks, conducted in a cordial atmosphere, showed the strength and inviolability of the fraternal, friendly ties and the unity of views. Soviet people are profoundly satisfied with the results of L.I. Brezhnev's visit to Hungary and Bulgaria.

Soviet people want to see every fraternal country a prosperous state, harmoniously combining rapid economic and scientific and technical growth with the flourishing of socialist culture and an upsurge in the people's well-being. With warm sympathy they follow the successful development of fraternal Hungary and Bulgaria, the fulfillment by the communists and all working people of these countries of the tasks set by the recently held party congresses, and the struggle to implement the Leninist ideas on building the new society. They are truly gladdened by any success and any achievement on the part of the fraternal peoples. The numerous instances of constantly developing economic ties are making them aware of the creative enthusiasm with which the working peoples of these countries have entered into the fulfillment of the comprehensive program adopted at the 25th CEMA session.

The community of socialist states is the reliable stronghold of the peoples in the struggle against imperialism and for socialism, peace and social progress. Its role in preserving and strengthening peace in Europe is particularly great. The pan-European conference, the ratification of the treaties between the USSR and the FRG and between Poland and the FRG and the reduction of armaments and armed forces in Europe must become important landmarks on the path of consolidating a stable peace on our continent. The meetings in Budapest and Sofia demonstrated once more the unity of views on urgent problems of the international situation, and above all on problems of European security.

For people's Bulgaria these fall days will remain memorable also because its loyal son Todor Zhivkov was awarded the Order of Lenin. Todor Zhivkov was given this high award for outstanding services in the development of friendship and cooperation between the peoples of our countries and in the consolidation of peace and socialism, and for many years of active participation in the world communist movement.

By creatively applying the teaching of Marx, Engels and Lenin, and by interacting in an extensive and comprehensive manner and strengthening their political and economic unity still further, the socialist countries are moving forward. Our party and state and the entire Soviet people are doing everything to insure that they walk side by side as a united friendly family, helping each other, that the edifice of fraternal cooperation is bright and stable, and that an atmosphere of sincerity, cordiality, and mutual and profound trust reign in it.

Unity and cohesion multiply the forces of socialism. The firmer this unity and the stronger and deeper the alliance and interaction of the world socialist system with the working class of the capitalist countries and the national liberation movement, the more effective its influence on the development of world history.

5. "A One-Sided Interpretation," by Janez Stanic in Delo, 5 October 1971, Ljubljana, Yugoslavia.

Such joint communiques as the Yugoslav-Soviet one on Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia are necessarily compromises. Here it is not a question of "the conversion" of one or the other side, because any attempts of this kind would be unrealistic and doomed to failure in advance, but rather a question of seeking what unites the two partners, formulating principles which are acceptable to both, and an effort to insure that one side acknowledges and considers those basic starting points and views of the other side to which it attaches lesser importance within its own daily political practice and doctrine. The meaning and purpose of a compromise of this kind is precisely the fact that both sides must truly acknowledge and consider everything that is written and not just what suits them.

Rarely in the past did the Soviet press devote so much attention to similar occurrences as it did to Brezhnev's recent visit to Yugoslavia. It has published all the materials on the visit intended for publication, that is, Tito's and Brezhnev's toasts, Brezhnev's speech in Zemun, and the joint communique, as well as current reportage on the progress of the visit and commentaries. All this shows what significance Moscow attaches to this visit.

However, it is precisely this, that is, the evaluation of the significance of the visit, which has particularly found expression in commentaries, that provokes some thoughts. It is normal for each side concerned to emphasize what seems to it to be the most important thing, but it is not quite normal if it passes over in silence everything that the other side considers the most important.

For instance, in its Saturday issue PRAVDA, official organ of the CPSU Central Committee, devoted its editorial to the results of Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia. In this editorial it exclusively emphasizes that appears to be the most important to the Soviet side, but does not devote a single word to those results of the visit which are particularly important for Yugoslavia. For instance, the paper says: "As the joint statement adopted at the talks says, cooperation between the USSR and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is based on the sameness of the foundations of the social order and devotion to the principles of socialist internationalism." It is clearly written in the statement that this cooperation is also based on mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, and the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of the other side. At least as far as we

are concerned, these principles are certainly not just as easily disregarded ornamental addition; a commentary which passes over them in silence as the PRAVDA commentary does forces a one-sided nonobjective picture on the reader.

A similar thing also happens to many other parts of the joint statement. PRAVDA has much to say about the coordinated policy of the socialist states, the common struggle against imperialism, the common goals, the collective nature of the policy of the socialist states, and other similar things which, in its opinion, represent the values achieved by the recent Yugoslav-Soviet talks. The Soviet readers, who were given sufficiently detailed and carefully selected information on the "separate" policy of Yugoslavia in the recent past, must necessarily gain from these commentaries--similar commentaries have also been carried by other Soviet newspapers--the impression that the Yugoslav views have been thoroughly changed now and that the Yugoslavs have finally put an end to their "provocative" emphasis on their independence and sovereignty.

As far as comments of this kind are concerned, we can state that they are unobjective and forcing a distorted picture on their public of the real meaning of Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia for Soviet-Yugoslav relations and its true value. Our relations have future prospects only if both sides will take the principles which they recognized in agreement this time seriously, as well as those in 1955, 1956, and 1965. An arbitrary manipulation of these principles and the acceptance of only some of them cannot contribute to the establishment of the so greatly needed atmosphere of trust, and represent a poor service to the planned development of Soviet-Yugoslav relations.

BALTIMORE SUN
23 September 1971

CPYRGHT

Tito-Brezhnev

For Yugoslavia the key to the current talks between President Tito and Soviet party leader Brezhnev is a 16-year-old document, the Belgrade Declaration of 1955. At that time, in what amounted to a degree of Russian forgiveness for Tito's break with Stalin in 1948, the late Nikita Khrushchev acknowledged Yugoslavia's right to its own way of socialism. Yugoslavia very much wants that understanding renewed.	monwealth" is but a limited sovereignty. Yugoslavia declines to accept the idea of membership on those terms, particularly since Brezhnev's socialist commonwealth is obviously the Soviet bloc, and Yugoslavia dislikes all blocs.	lem of the nationalities. Some speculation is that Moscow's eye is on the future, and that it is already beginning to line up dissidents, nationalistic and other, toward the day when Tito has passed from the scene and a struggle for power ensues--unless, that is, Tito's plan for a collective presidency to succeed him works out.	carefully prepared form. Or, it is said, the issue first in Brezhnev's mind may be China, and he may be trying to persuade yet another Balkan country--as Romania has failed quite to be persuaded--that blocs do exist and do matter, and that the way of Albania is not the wise Balkan way.
Renewal has become important for two reasons. First, there is the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine which holds that the sovereignty of individual nations of the "socialist com-	Second, there are recent signs of Soviet meddling in Yugoslav affairs through an exploitation of nationalistic sentiment, meaning in this instance the sentiment of groups within multinational Yugoslavia. For example, Croatian exiles in Moscow have been permitted to surface with publicly reported anti-Serb speeches, a sure way of acerbating the always delicate Yugoslav prob-	Against this is the more benign reading that Brezhnev's purpose is mainly to sweet-talk Yugoslavia into not being an embarrassment in any developments leading to the European security conference Moscow wants; as Yugoslavia does too, but perhaps in a wider and more	There is always of course the implied threat of Soviet pressure by actual force; but Yugoslavia is betting that today's apparent Soviet policy of European detente rules that out at this time. In Yugoslav calculations betting is a constant element.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
27 September 1971

Assurance from Brezhnev

CPYRGHT

'Hands off' Belgrade

By Eric Bourne
Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Belgrade

The talks between the Yugoslavs and Soviet party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev ended with a joint declaration reflecting a narrow success margin for the local team.

Any meaningful compromise over political disputes is usually a settlement which leaves neither side fully satisfied. And so it would seem in this case.

The Yugoslavs, however, gained their essential points. These were:

- Reassurance that the old 1955 and two subsequent declarations agreed with the Soviets guaranteeing them freedom from interference in their independent "road to socialism" again is accepted in Moscow as the basis of their relations.

- That Soviet ideas on European security and a status quo on post-World War II frontiers, etc., apply in the Balkans as a stable and peaceful, permanent nuclear-free zone, as well as for Central Europe.

The Yugoslavs scored also with an agreement designed to halt polemics that have aroused feelings on both side for a long time.

This apparently applies not only to old Cominformist propaganda activities from Moscow, but also to the recent Soviet-bloc sniping at Yugoslavia's newly normalized ties with Communist China and the incessant bickering from Bulgaria over Yugoslav Macedonia.

But to gain this, President Tito and his aides seem also to have accepted that some curbs also are desirable on the side of the Yugoslav press and other information media.

The declaration foreshadows more links and exchanges among media and in art and other culture.

On both sides, press, radio, and television, it says, should be concerned with "strengthening mutual respect and friendship" with "objective and well-intentioned" coverage of the two countries' efforts to build socialism and communism.

There could be some resentment of this from the ebullient Yugoslav media, though they have several times in the past year been warned by President Tito that they were exceeding the boundaries of the limited press freedom enjoyed here, in internal controversy as well as outside issues.

There is no censorship as such. But newspapers and their commentators apply their own self-censorship and presumably now will abandon the recent tit-for-tat exchanges with the bloc of their own volition, as long as the other side does the same.

Too much should not be read into the agreements on greater contacts between the Yugoslav and Soviet Communist Parties.

This feature was strongly pressed by the Russians and there are certainly more allusions to party links and "the party" than were anticipated by the Yugoslav side.

But beyond the expressions of common views on social-political philosophies and aims, and some classic Marxist thrusts at capitalism and imperialism, which the Yugoslavs acknowledge anyway, Mr. Brezhnev did not gain much.

New ties limited

Expanded party ties will not go beyond more frequent exchanges of opinion, consultations and two-way traffic in study groups and the lower-level "basic party organizations."

The most valued "achievement" here is obviously Mr. Brezhnev's agreement that — as in the dictum conceded by his predecessor Nikita S. Khrushchev in 1955 — the "methods of building socialism, expressing the [various] experiences and characteristics of national development, are the affair of the peoples and the working class" in each country and should not cause conflict.

One may expect now to hear less Soviet caviling at those Balkan states, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Albania, that latterly have emerged as a trio linked by mutually friendly attitudes toward China.

The Yugoslavs have been highly indignant at bloc allegations that friendship with China and Chinese "presence" in the Balkans was something anti-Soviet and a connivance in a new threat to the Soviet Union, from the giant neighbor on its Far Eastern border.

They have, therefore, set out to reassure the Soviets. But even they have been surprised by the intensity of Soviet suspicions and their apprehension over China.

NEW YORK TIMES
CPYRGHT 10 October 1971

CPYRGHT

Tito Expresses Confidence In New Defense System

KARLOVAC, Yugoslavia, Oct. (AP)—President Tito said today that Yugoslavia's new defense system would protect the country and her independence from

all who sought to destroy them. He spoke to a crowd estimated at 200,000 in this central Yugoslav city at the conclusion of what the Government termed the country's biggest military maneuvers ever. Mr. Tito denied that the ma-

neuvres were directed against any country, and specifically mentioned the East European Communist countries. He said that the maneuvers had been directed against anyone who would endanger our integrity and our country. This new system was intro-

duced after the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Designed purely for defensive purposes, the system provides for close cooperation between the regular army and the public in any war against a stronger enemy.

NEW YORK TIMES
26 September 1971

BREZHNEV ACCEPTS YUGOSLAV'S VIEW ON INDEPENDENCE

Signs Declaration With Tito
After 3 Days of Talks—
Party Ties Stressed

BETTER RELATIONS SEEN

Khrushchev's '55 Pledge on
Noninterference Is Cited
—Trade to Be Increased

By JAMES FERON

Special to The New York Times

BELGRADE, Yugoslavia, Sept. 25—Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist party leader, and President Tito of Yugoslavia signed a new Belgrade declaration today reaffirming Yugoslavia's political independence and her right to develop Communism in her own way.

The lengthy document, drafted in three days of bargaining, also calls for strengthening of links between the two Communist parties, especially in terms of exchanges of experts.

This was seen as a concession to Mr. Brezhnev, who sought development of party ties in exchange for his restatement of the 1955 Belgrade dec-

laration signed by Marshal Tito and Nikita S. Khrushchev, the Soviet Premier at the time, recognizing Yugoslavia's political and ideological independence.

Brezhnev to Budapest

The Brezhnev-Tito talks ended this morning. Mr. Brezhnev then flew to the Budapest, where he was met by Hungarian party chief, Janos Kadar. Mr. Brezhnev is expected to make a similar brief stop tomorrow in Sofia before returning to Moscow.

The Soviet leader will probably confer with Hungarian and Bulgarian allies on the results of the Belgrade talks and to establish what is likely to be a new approach to Yugoslavia, at least for the near future.

Yugoslavia's growing ties with China have been under attack by Hungarian newspapers this summer, while the Bulgarians reopened a propaganda campaign against Belgrade over the Macedonians, found in both countries.

Observers here saw the Brezhnev-Tito talks as having set the stage for re-establishment of normal relations not only between Moscow and Belgrade but also between Moscow's close Eastern European allies and the Balkan dissidents, which include Rumania and Albania.

Today's Belgrade document covered state and party relations; increases economic, scientific, cultural and political ties, and a wide range of views on international issues.

The most crucial section, as far as Marshal Tito is concerned, was the reaffirmation

of Yugoslavia's right to pursue a policy of political nonalignment and ideological independence.

"The methods of building socialism, which express the experiences and characteristics of development in various countries, is the affair of the peoples and working class of these countries and should not conflict with each other," the declaration stated.

It also said: "The development of Yugoslav-Soviet relations is based on the principles expressed in the Belgrade Declaration of 1955, in the Moscow Statement and Declaration of 1956 and the joint Yugoslav-Soviet Statement of 1965."

These principles include "respect for sovereignty, independence, integrity and equality among states [and] noninterference in internal affairs for any reason—of economic, political and ideological nature—since questions of internal order, different social systems and different forms of development of socialism are an exclusive matter for the peoples of individual countries."

It also condemns "any aggression and any attempt to impose political and economic domination over other countries."

The declaration said cooperation between the two countries was based on "identity of basic social systems, and close approach to many international problems" as well as devotion to socialist principles, peace, independence, international cooperation and the struggle against imperialism.

Many aspects of the declaration contained conditional phrases, such as the identity of "basic" social system, which leave room for Soviet centrally controlled economy and Yugoslavia's more diffuse system, including worker self-manage-

ment of industry.

The "close approach to many international problems was apparently as close as they could come in such a document to agreeing that their foreign policies were quite unlike.

Favor Security Conference

They agreed, however, that the convening of a European security conference was essential, that the Balkan should be a nuclear-free zone, that China and the East and West Germany's should be admitted to the United Nations and that American "aggression" in Southeast Asia should be condemned.

Observers here saw the references to increased party links as a major concession to Mr. Brezhnev. Yugoslav sources had indicated, however, that they were prepared to accept the somewhat general appeal for closer links for what they thought was the more specific reacknowledgement by Mr. Brezhnev of the Khrushchev agreement on noninterference.

The talks were extended through yesterday, although the day had been set aside for hunting, and Mr. Brezhnev's departure this morning was seen by observers as cool and formal.

A communiqué released in advance of the declaration spoke of the talks having been conducted in a spirit of friendship, comradely frankness and mutual understanding. Comradely frankness is a term generally used in Communist communiqués to mean disagreement.

The Soviet leader, who was reported to have suffered a slight cold during his stay here, invited Marshal Tito to visit the Soviet Union at a date to be determined later. Marshal Tito is scheduled to pay a state visit to the United States late next month.

CPYRGHT WASHINGTON POST
27 September 1971

Brezhnev Sees Allies After Tito

CPYRGHT

SOFIA, Bulgaria, Sept. 26 (UPI)—Soviet Communist Party chief Leonid I. Brezhnev arrived today from Hungary on a flying tour through Eastern Europe to brief Warsaw Pact leaders on his talks with Yugoslav President Tito.

Brezhnev was met at Sofia airport by Bulgarian party chief Todor Zhivkov and other party and government leaders.

His arrival came before the Hungarian news agency MTI had announced his departure from Budapest. This under-

lined Hungary's tendency to keep news about the Brezhnev visit in Budapest to a minimum.

Yesterday Brezhnev concluded a three-day visit to Yugoslavia, where he reaffirmed Moscow's guarantee of Yugoslavia's right to control

its own internal affairs.

Instead of going home to Moscow after the visit, as officially planned, he flew first to Hungary and then to Bulgaria to tell his allies why he endorsed Tito's liberalized brand of communism.